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MANDAMUS IN NEW MEXICO
CHARLES T. DUMARS*
MICHAEL B. BROWDE**
INTRODUCTION
Although the common law origins of the writ of mandamus are
somewhat obscure,' mandamus apparently began as nothing more
than a royal wish or direction conveyed to subordinates regarding
something the King wished done.2 Sir Edward Coke is credited with
first formalizing the writ when, as Chief Judge of the King's Bench,
in Bagg's Case,3 he took the King's prerogative into his own hand
and fashioned a remedy to restore an official to office.4 Nearly a
century later, Chief Justice Holt defined the writ as applying to
matters public in nature,' and limited its use to situations where no
other remedy existed.6 Building from these essentials, Lord Mans-
fied, Chief Justice of King's Bench in the mid-eighteenth century,
formulated mandamus into an established remedy for an individual
to obtain redress of grievances against officers and bodies of govern-
ment.7 By the late 18th century, the writ had become so entrenched
that Blackstone could describe it in terms which readily serve as a
definition for the modern writ:
A Writ of Mandamus is in general, a command issuing in the King's
name from the Court of King's Bench, and directed to any person,
corporation, or inferior court of judicature within the King's domin-
ions requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified,
which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of
King's Bench has previously determined, or at least supposes to be
consonant with right and justice.8
*Member of the Bar, State of Arizona and State of New Mexico; Adjunct Professor of
Law, University of New Mexico Law School.
**Member of the Bar, District of Columbia and State of New Mexico.
1. Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 Yale L. J. 523, 529 (1923). See
generally Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and
Mandamus, 9 N. Y. L Forum 478, 486-87 (1963); F. Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary
Legal Remedies 218 (1926).
2. Weintraub, supra note 1, at 479-80.
3. 11 Co. Rep. 93, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615).
4. For a discussion of Bagg's Case, see Jenks, supra note 1, at 530.
5. Parkinson's case, Holt, 143, 90 Eng. Rep. 977 (K.B. 1689).
6. Case of Andover, Holt, 442, 90 Eng. Rep. 1143 (K.B. 1701).
7. See generally Weintraub, supra note 1, at 498-502. Eminating originally from the
King's Bench, the Writ was legal rather than equitable in nature. Jenks, supra note 1, at 532;
Ferris, supra note 1, at 221-22.
8. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *110.
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The prerogative writ of mandamus, along with general King's
Bench jurisdiction, found roots in the early courts of the American
Colonies.9 As in England," ° however, the American states generally
adopted statutory provisions governing writs of mandamus. 1 1 In-
deed, the current New Mexico mandamus statute harks back to
Blackstone's definition, and has remained virtually unchanged since
its first enactment in 1884.1 2
It is the purpose of this article to give a broad overview of man-
damus in New Mexico in a manner which will prove instructive to the
prospective mandamus litigant. After outlining in some detail the
legal basis for the writ and the statutory requirements which govern
its issuance, attention will be given to the case law suggesting that
mandamus is an exclusive remedy against official wrongdoing. The
bulk of the article then deals with the three most litigated mandamus
questions: (1) Who has standing? (2) When is the remedy at law
inadequate so that mandamus will lie? And (3) what constitutes
official discretion which cannot be controlled by the writ? Finally,
special attention is paid to the relationship between mandamus and
the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
LEGAL BASIS AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution provides
that the supreme court ". . . shall have original jurisdiction in...
mandamus against all state officers, boards and commissions." Sec-
tion 6 of that same article gives district courts original jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the supreme court to issue writs of man-
damus, but prohibits their issuance to courts of equal or superior
jurisdiction. Notwithstanding these clear constitutional directives,
New Mexico statutory law gives exclusive original jurisdiction to the
district court or a judge thereof.' I It is primarily from these sources
the supreme court and the district courts derive their power to issue
writs of mandamus. 
1 4
9. See generally, Goodman, Mandamus in the Colonies-The Rise of the Superintending
Power of American Courts, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist. 308 (1957), continued at 2 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 1 & 129 (1958).
10. See, Note, Mandamus: Common Law and Statutory Developments, 20 Iowa L. Rev.
667, 669-72 (1935).
11. E.g., Id. at 671; Note, Mandamus in New England, 37 Boston U.L. Rev. 456, 457
(1957).
12. Laws of N.M. 1884, ch. 1, § 37.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-3 (1953).
14. See, e.g., State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968). The
supreme court held in State ex rel. Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71, 428 P.2d
473 (1967), that Article VI, Section 29, of the New Mexico Constitution, does not confer
upon the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs. The court did
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The conflict between Article VI, Section 3 of the Constitution and
New Mexico statutory law has never given rise to difficulty since the
supreme court, irrespective of the statute, has regularly exercised
original jurisdiction in mandamus.' 5 However, Supreme Court Rule
12 has given force and effect to the policy behind the statute,' 6 by
requiring that an original petition which could have been brought in
a lower court must set forth "the circumstances necessary or proper
to seek the writ in the supreme court."' ' The standard applied in
exercising original jurisdiction under the Rule has been whether the
particular case is of such public importance to the state as to require
original consideration by the high court.' " Absent a compelling rea-
son for bringing the action in the supreme court, the district court is
the proper forum for a mandamus action against anyone other than
another district court.
The New Mexico statutes delineate in some detail the require-
ments for a proper mandamus action.' As more fully developed
below,2 0 these requirements are often strictly construed. 2' The writ
may be issued to any inferior "tribunal, corporation, board or person
to compel the performance of an act which the law especially enjoins
as a duty resulting from an "office trust or station."'2 2 Although the
not decide, however, whether the court of appeals could issue writs to lower tribunals under
its inherent power in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Castilo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 79 N.M. 357,
443 P.2d 850 (1968).
16. No doubt the legislature, in enacting § 22-12-3, recognized that the primary function
of the supreme court, as the ultimate appellate tribunal of the State, should not be undercut
by the needless concern for cases which could first be presented to an inferior tribunal.
17. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-2-1(12)(a)(1) (1953). This subsection represents an amend-
ment to the Rules, effective May 1, 1974, and tracks the language of its predecessor,
Supreme Court Rule 24.
18. State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968); Stateexrel. Cas-
tillo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm'n, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1968); State ex
rel. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Worden, 44 N.M. 400, 103 P.2d 124 (1940). In Thomp-
son v. Legislative Audit Commission, 79 N.M. 693, 448 P.2d 799 (1968), the court found
issuance of the original writ proper "... . in view of the possible inadequacy of other rem-
edies and the necessity of an early decision on the question of great public importance." Id.
at 694-95, 448 P.2d at 800-01.
In addition, on rare occasions, the court will, under its "superintending power" over in-
ferior courts conferred by Article VI, Section 3, issue the writ to lower courts irrespective of
traditional or statutory mandamus considerations. State ex rel. Dubois v. Ryan, 85 N.M.
575, 514 P.2d 851 (1973); Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771 (1961).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 22-12-6 to 11 (1953). See generally, Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84
N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972); Laumbauch v. Board of County Comm'rs, 60 N.M. 226, 290
P.2d 1067 (1955).
20. See the Exclusivity of Mandamus, infra pp. 165-169.
21. Even a pro se indigent prisoner in solitary confinement has been held to the strict
requirements of mandamus pleading. Birdo v. Rodriquez, 84 N.M. 207, 501 P.2d 195
(1972).
22. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-4 (1953).
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writ may require an inferior tribunal or body to exercise judgment or
to discharge its functions, the New Mexico statute provides that it
cannot control "judicial discretion."' 2  Nor will the writ issue when
there is a "plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law."' 24  Furthermore, a party seeking the writ must be "benefi-
cially interested"' 2 5 in the action sought to be compelled.
The procedure for filing a mandamus action is rather convoluted.
The party seeking the writ files a "petition for writ of man-
damus.",2 6 If the petition is proper in form, 27 the court issues an
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-14 (1953). See When Mandamus Will Lie, Section C, infra.
24. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-5 (1953). See When Mandamus Will Lie, Section B, infra.
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-5 (1953). See When Mandamus Will Lie, Section A, infra.
26. The precise designation of the parties is a matter of some confusion. The statute
(N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 22-12-1 through 22-12-14 (1953)] refers to the party seeking the writ
as the plaintiff, the party opposing the writ as the defendant. Supreme Court Rule 12, how-
ever, refers to the party against whom the writ is sought as the respondent, and the party
seeking the writ as the petitioner. The court has referred to the parties in a mandamus
action as petitioner and respondent, State ex rel. Barela v. New Mexico State Board of
Education, 80 N.M. 220, 453 P.2d 583 (1969), as applicant and defendant, Hutchison v.
Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140 (1937), as plaintiff and defendant, Laumbauch v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 60 N.M. 226, 290 P.2d 1067 (1955) and as relator and re-
spondent, State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968). In an attempt
to avoid confusion, the parties shall be denominated petitioner and respondent throughout
this article.
Mandamus cases have on some occasions been styled "state ex rel .. ", and on other
occasions the caption does not involve the state at all. Since most petitioners stand in the
posture of a private attorney general, it is proper to caption mandamus cases "State ex
rel. . .". But see Dunn v. Town of Gallup, 38 N.M. 197, 29 P.2d 1053 (1934).
27. The following represents a hypothetical petition in proper form:
STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF LOBO
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex. rel.
ABC ENTERPRIZES, INC.,
Petitioner,
No.
-vs-
CITY OF LOBO, a
municipality,
Respondent.
VERIFIED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
Petitioner alleges:
1. Petitioner is a corporation doing business within the City and County of
Lobo.
2. Respondent is a municipality within Lobo County, State of New
Mexico.
3. Petitioner is taxed by the City of Lobo at a rate of 10 mills whereas
[Vol. 4
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order2 8 directing the court clerk to issue the writ.' I
The court may issue either an "alternative" writ or a "peremp-
tory" writ, based upon the prayer in the Petition. The alternative
other incorporated businesses within that same municipality are taxed at only
5 mills.
4. The Respondent has a mandatory non-discretionary duty to follow the
United States Constitution.
5. This arbitrary taxation scheme is invidious and discriminatory in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
6. The Respondent has breached its mandatory non-discretionary duty to
follow the United States Constitution by implementing and applying the dis-
criminatory taxation scheme against Respondent.
7. Petitioner is a person "beneficially interested" in the issues of this case,
namely the taxation schemes of the City of Lobo, in the same manner as all
members of the public at large. Petitioner is also uniquely affected by the un-
constitutional conduct of the Respondent.
8. Petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
cause of law.
WHEREFORE Petitioner prays that it be awarded a Writ of Mandamus
commanding Respondent to:
1) comply with its mandatory non-discretionary duty to tax all busi-
nesses within the municipality including Petitioner, on an equitable non-dis-
criminatory basis.
2) pay to Petitioner the damages it sustained as a result of the unlawful
conduct of Respondents together with costs and disbursements.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorney for Petitioner.
(verified)
28. The Order of the Court in the petition referred to in note 27, supra, would read as
follows:
STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF LOBO
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex. rel.
ABC ENTERPRIZES, INC.,
Petitioner,
No.
-vs-
CITY OF LOBO, a
municipality,
Respondent.
ORDER FOR AL TERNA TIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
This matter having come before the Court upon the verified Petition of Peti-
May 1974]
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writ is in the nature of an order to show cause, and directs the
respondent to either grant the relief requested or show cause before
the court on a certain date why he has not done so. The peremptory
tioner; it appearing to the satisfaction of the Court from the Petition that the
Petitioner is entitled to the relief requested in the Petition; it further appearing
that an Alternative Writ should issue; that Petitioner has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and that this remedy is pre-
scribed by statute,
IT IS ORDERED that an Alternative Writ of Mandamus in due form of law
be issued by the Clerk of this Court commanding Respondent to:
1. Comply with its mandatory non-discretionary duty to tax all businesses
within the municipality, including Petitioner, on an equitable, non-discrim-
inatory basis.
2. Pay to Petitioner the damages sustained as a result of the unlawful con-
duct of Respondents together with costs and disbursements; or show cause
before this Court at _ o'clock in the noon of the - day of
,1973, why they should not do so.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that true copies of the Petition, the Writ, and
this Order be served upon Respondent in the same manner as a summons in a
civil action.
District Court Judge
29. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-6 (1953). The writ in our hypothetical case would appear as
follows:
STATE OF NEW MEXICO COUNTY OF LOBO
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
STATE OF NEW MEXICO ex. rel.
ABC ENTERPRIZES, INC.,
Petitioner,
No.:
-vs-
CITY OF LOBO, a
municipality.
Respondent.
ALTERNATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
TO: City of Lobo,
a municipality
GREETINGS: Whereas it appears to the Court as follows:
1. Whereas Petitioner is a corporation doing business within the City and
County of Lobo.
2. Whereas Respondent is a municipality within Lobo County, State of
New Mexico.
3. Whereas Petitioner is taxed by the City of Lobo at a rate of 10 mills
whereas other incorporated businesses within that same municipality are taxed
at only 5 mills.
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writ is a final appealable order which may be issued without notice
to the opposing party "when the right to require the performance of
the act is clear and it is apparent that no valid excuse can be given for
not performing it."30
The alternative writ is the usual writ sought since the peremptory
writ is issued ex parte and grants final relief without any prior notice
or opportunity to be heard. Although the New Mexico Supreme
Court held in an early case that issuance of a peremptory writ did
not contravene due process of law, 3' more recent cases3 2 expanding
4. Whereas the Respondent has a mandatory non-discretionary duty to
follow the United States Constitution.
5. Whereas this arbitrary taxation scheme is invidious and discriminatory in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
6. Whereas the Respondent has breached its mandatory non-discretionary
duty to follow the United States Constitution by implementing and applying
the discriminatory taxation scheme against Respondent.
7. Whereas Petitioner is a person "beneficially interested" in the issues of
this case namely the taxation schemes of the City of Lobo, in the same man-
ner as all members of the public at large. Petitioner is also, uniquely affected
by the unconstitutional conduct of the Respondent.
8. Whereas Petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the or-
dinary course of law.
THEREFORE, you are commanded forthwith to:
1. Comply with your mandatory non-discretionary duty to tax all busi-
nesses within the municipality, including Petitioner, on an equitable, non-dis-
criminatory basis.
2. Pay to Petitioner the damages sustained as a result of the unlawful
conduct of Respondent together with costs and disbursements; or show cause
before this Court at _ o'clock in the ... -noon of the - day of
,1973, why you should not do so.
DISTRICT COURT CLERK
30. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-7 (1953). The need for peremptory writs might as well be
questioned since injunction in aid of mandamus is always available. See, e.g., Laumbauch v.
Board of County Commissioners, 60 N.M. 226, 290 P.2d 1067 (1955).
31. In Board of County Commissioners v. Fourth Judicial District, 29 N.M. 244, 259,
223 P. 516, 520 (1924), the court found no due process violation was involved because the
respondents, County Commissioners, as public officers, had not been deprived of any
"rights" protected by the Constitution:
A public officer who is commanded to perform an official duty, suffers
neither in his personal or his property rights, and these rights alone are safe-
guarded by the Constitution.
Unfortunately, the conclusion of the court that no "rights" were involved because no
public officer has a "right" to breach his public duty begs rather than decides the due
process issue.
Interestingly, since the writ had been issued ex parte immediately after the petition was
filed, no service had been effected upon the respondents. Against the contention that the
lower court had acquired no in personam jurisdiction, the court held that the filing of an
answer attacking the final judgment as invalid because the parties were not allowed to
appear, was a waiver of their contention the court lacked in personam jurisdiction.
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, reh. den., 409 U.S. 902 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402
May 1974]
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the concept of due process have so undercut that earlier ruling as to
render use of the peremptory writ constitutionally suspect 3 3 and
inadvisable.
In addition to delineating the full and complete allegations of the
petition, the alternative writ designates the return day and the man-
ner of service. 3 4 On the return day, the party respondent is obligated
to file a response in the same manner as an answer to a complaint in
a civil action. s If no answer is filed on the return date, the court
may enter a default and award a peremptory writ.3 6 The statute
further provides that if an answer is filed containing new matter "the
Plaintiff may at the trial or other proceeding avail himself of any
valid objection to its sufficiency or may countervail it by evidence
either in direct denial or by way of avoidance.
' 3 1
The pleadings in a mandamus action are construed and may be
amended in the same manner as pleadings in any other civil action. 8
Issues raised by the pleadings are tried in the same manner as any
other civil action,3 I but there exists no right to trial by jury.4 0 The
court has the power to extend the time within which to answer a
U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972). In
Blackhurst, supra, the court, following Fuentes, decided due process requires that prior to
issuance of a writ of replevin, the defendant must be given notice and an opportunity to be
heard. The same should be true of a writ of mandamus.
33. Should the Board of County Commissioners issue arise again, it is hard to see how
public officials would be given less due process protection than other citizens. Surely, in
light of the cases referred to in note 32, supra, the court would be compelled to abandon
Board of County Commissioners. Cf Gomez v. Dulce Independent School District, 85 N.M.
708, 516 P.2d 697 (1974).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-8 (1953). On original petitions, the supreme court often
requires oral argument on the issue of whether an alternative writ should issue. Presumably,
in cases other than against District Judges, this would be to determine whether the issue is
of sufficient "public interest" to warrant issuance of the writ originally. However, in a case
seeking a writ against a district judge, such preliminary oral argument is unnecessary. Such
cases should always be heard on the merits.
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-10 (1953). The statute does not specify whether the return
date is also the trial setting. Supreme court practice generally is to require trial on the return
date unless the court instructs otherwise. The general district court practice also requires
trial on the return date. This is understandable despite the absence of the usual 30-day
answer time, Cf. N.M.R. Civ. P. 12(a), given the extraordinary nature of the writ. The
general practice is tempered, however, by the natural proclivity of the courts to allow
extensions of time when necessary for adequate preparation, especially in cases involving
important questions of public policy. See text accompanying note 41, infra.
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-10 (1953). Of course, no due process problem is posed by a
peremptory writ entered after service on the opposing party, followed by his failure to
respond.
37. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-10 (1953).
38. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-11 (1953).
39. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-11 (1953).
40. Territory of New Mexico ex. rel. Lewis v. Commissioner of Bernalillo County, 5 N.M.
1, 16 P. 855 (1888).
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writ past the designated return date, and the supreme court has held
that extensions of time or leave to amend should be freely
granted.4 1 Since mandamus pleadings are construed in the same
manner as pleadings in other civil actions, the broad rules relating to
notice pleading contained in Rules 8 and 12 of the New Mexico
Rules of Civil Procedure are used to test the sufficiency of the
writ. 4 2
If judgment is awarded a petitioner, he is entitled as a matter of
right to recover the damages he has sustained together with costs and
disbursements. 4 1 If a peremptory mandamus is issued to a public
officer, body or board, and the officer or member of the body or
board does not comply with the order, absent some showing of "just
excuse," he may be fined up to $250.00.4 4 The fine is paid into the
state treasury and when paid, is a bar to any further action for any
"penalty incurred by such officer or member of such body or board
by reason of his refusal or neglect to perform."14  This provision
does not, however, preclude the court from jailing for contempt any
person refusing to comply with its order.4 6 Appeals are taken from
mandamus judgments in the same manner as from any other ac-
tion, 4 1 including the requirement that parties submit findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
The mandamus statute provides that the case is to be tried on the
writ and the answer.4 8 In applying the statute the supreme court has
41. State ex rel. Fitzhugh v. City Counsel of Hot Springs, 56 N.M. 118, 41 P.2d 100
(1952); State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P.2d 242 (1926).
42. Heron v. Kool, 47 N.M. 218, 140 P.2d 737 (1943); State ex rel. Burg v. City of
Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926).
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-12 (1953).
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-13 (1953).
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-13 (1953).
46. In re Delgado, 140 U.S. 586 (1891).
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-14 (1953). The supreme court has stated that in a manda-
mus action against the state to enforce a pre-existing judgment, the peremptory writ of
mandamus to pay the judgment is not a final order for purposes of appeal, but rather a
pleading auxillary to a pre-existing judgment similar to a writ of execution. Consequently, in
that circumstance, absent some jurisdictional contention, no appeal would be allowed. State
ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Quesenberry, 72 N.M. 291, 383 P.2d 255 (1963).
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-11 (1953). See State ex rel. Cheser v. Beall, 41 N.M. 652,
73 P.2d 329 (1939). The supreme court in State ex rel. Fitzhugh v. Council of City of Hot
Springs, 56 N.M. 118, 241 P.2d 100 (1952), though noting that a motion to dismiss was not
a proper pleading in a mandamus action found it was not reversible error to deny the
motion and grant leave to answer even after the return date of the writ.
Although the case is to be tried on the writ and the answer, this principle has not been
applied so stringently as to foreclose intervention. But cf. Mobile America, Inc. v. Sandoval
County Comm'n., N.M. ,518 P.2d 774 (1974). Non-state public officers have been
allowed to file a "complaint in intervention," and oppose the relief requested by the
petitioner, Schmitz v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 55 N.M. 320, 232 P.2d 986
(1951), as well as to file a third-party answer, Belmore v. State Tax Comm'n., 56 N.M. 436,
May 1974]
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held that after issuance of the alternative writ the petition drops
away and is a nullity.4 9
The court in an early case held that a public body could not use
mandamus to compel other public officers to perform their statutory
duties as it was not the "real party in interest."" 0 More recently,
however, the Court in Reese v. Dempsey, 5 ' made it clear that any
public body may seek mandamus to compel a duty owed to it by
another as a function of its status as a public body.5 2
The court has also held that a mandamus action may be dismissed
for failure to join an indispensable party when the petitioner fails to
join every person who has an act to perform in connection with the
granting of the relief requested,5 ' and where it is not within the
power of the respondent to perform the act requested.5 4 However,
the better and more practical rule was articulated by the court in
State v. Quesenberry, s ' where the petitioner was seeking to enforce
a money judgment against the State Highway Commission. The re-
spondent contended that the petition should be dismissed for failure
to join an indispensable party, or parties. Even though the judgment
ran only against the State Highway Commission, the respondent
argued that the chief highway engineer, the director of finance and
administration, and the state treasurer were indispensable parties.
245 P.2d 149 (1952). Furthermore, mandamus actions have been successfully combined
with actions for declaratory and injunctive relief. Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500
P.2d 242 (1972).
One pitfall to be avoided is answering allegations contained in the petition but not
contained in the writ. If allegations contained in the petition are answered, the court can
treat them as if they were contained in the writ. State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque,
31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926). Rather than answering the petition, the appropriate
procedure is to assert as the first defense in the responsive pleading that the writ is insuffi-
cient, and limit the remainder of the response to the actual writ. For an extended discussion
of the problems created the writ-and-the-answer rule, see Exclusivity of Mandamus, infra
p.
49. State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926).
Supreme Court Rule 12(a) mitigates this rule in original jurisdiction cases by
providing that "the proposed form of writ may have the petition appended as
an exhibit." That procedure, however, will not suffice in district court actions.
State ex. rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, supra; Alfred v. Anderson, 13 New
Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions 54, 55 (1974).
50. Board of Commissioners of Bernalillo County v. Hubbell, 28 N.M. 634, 216 P. 496
(1923).
51. 48 N.M. 417,152 P.2d 157 (1944).
52. See also, City of Santa Rosa v. Jaramillo, N.M. , 517 P.2d 69 (1974). It
should be noted that supreme court rule 12(a)(2) requires in original actions against public
officers that the petitioner set forth the names of any real parties in interest.
53. Chavez v. Baca, 47 N.M. 471, 144 P.2d 175 (1943).
54. Territory ex rel. Lester v. Suddith, 15 N.M. 728, 110 P. 1058 (1910). State ex rel.
State Board of Education v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 162, 386 P.2d 252 (1963).
55. 74 N.M. 30, 390 P.2d 273 (1964).
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The basis of the argument was that under the statute, the chief
highway engineer was required to sign the voucher, the director of
the department of finance and administration must issue the warrant,
and the state treasurer must pay it. The court gave this argument the
burial it deserved:
As applied to the circumstances here present, we believe the better
rule to be that persons are not indispensable parties who have mere
ministerial duties to carry out in paying a judgment. [citations
omitted] There should be no presumption, absent a showing to the
contrary, that an officer who is to perform merely ministerial duties
will refuse to act.
5 6
Thus, under Quesenberry, a petitioner need not join every single
public officer in the chain of command when he seeks the perfor-
mance of a statutory duty.
Finally, the court has rejected the contention that mandamus is
improper if it seeks negative relief, i.e. to compel a public officer not
to act. In New Mexico mandamus will lie to compel an officer to act
or to enjoin him from acting.' 5
THE EXCLUSIVITY OF MANDAMUS
In 1944, the case of Heron v. Garcia5  was decided by the su-
preme court. Born in obscurity, Heron was destined to spawn the
most serious problem confounding New Mexico mandamus practice;
a problem which must ultimately be faced and resolved by the
supreme court.
In Heron, the petitioner brought an action against the county
treasurer of Rio Arriba County seeking to compel him to issue peti-
tioner a tax deed to property previously taken for delinquent taxes.
The treasurer refused because two years previously he had issued a
deed to another person claiming to be the owner. Although not
brought in mandamus, the court concluded this was an action in the
nature of mandamus and specifically held that "Any order com-
manding a public officer to perform a ministerial duty is equivalent
to a writ of mandamus and should be governed by the rules for
issuing such writs."' 9
Since a mandamus action must be tried on the writ and the
56. 74 N.M. at 32-33, 390 P.2d at 275.
57. State ex rel. Roberson v. Board of Ed. City of Santa Fe, 70 N.M. 261, 372 P.2d 832
(1963); Kiddy v. Board of County Commissioners of Eddy County, 57 N.M. 145, 255 P.2d
678 (1953); State ex rel. Shepard v. Mechem, 56 N.M. 762, 250 P.2d 897 (1952).
58. 48 N.M. 507, 153 P.2d 514 (1944).
59. 48 N.M. at 510, 153 P.2d at 515. The court denied the writ for failure to find a
"clear" non-discretionary duty owed the petitioner.
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answer, and since the court had already blurred the lines between
mandamus and negative injunction, 6 0 Heron raised the specter of
the case brought (apparently properly) in injunction, but "in the
nature of mandamus" which must fail because of the absence of a
writ in proper form. Furthermore, if as Heron suggested, mandamus
is an exclusive remedy, the possibility was raised that future litigants
would be subjected to reversal based merely on the form of the
action and the pleadings.
Unfortunately, the specter of Heron came to life in Laumbauch v.
County Commissioners.61 Laumbauch began with a complaint in the
District Court of San Miguel County challenging an annexation elec-
tion. The complaint alleged that certain illegal votes had been cast,
and that other qualified electors had been denied the right to vote. It
further alleged that if the balance of the duly qualified voters were
counted as required by law the result of the election would have
been changed. The complaint then asked for the following relief:
1. That Defendants [election Judges] be required to count said re-
jected ballots or to call in the judges of election from said precincts
numbers 22 and 65 of San Miguel County. To count the same for
their respective precincts and to correct their returns.
2. That Defendants be required to deduct from said returns from
said precincts the votes non resident and unqualified and challenged
voters or to call in the judge of election to do so and to correct the
returns.
3. That the Defendants be enjoined from proceeding with said
canvass of election and that they continue to canvass by postpone-
ment thereof until they show cause if any they have, why they
should not do as stated in Paragraph I and II of this prayer. 6 2
The trial court signed an "Order to Show Cause" why an injunction
should not issue. The defendants answered by filing a document
entitled "Response to Alternative Writ of Mandamus," consisting of
legal exceptions to the sufficiency of the "Order to Show Cause"
which the defendants contended was an alternative writ of man-
damus. The trial court found that although plaintiff had not in-
tended to file an action in mandamus, this was in fact a mandamus
action. Based upon that finding, the court held that the "Order to
Show Cause" (now considered the alternative writ) did not contain
sufficient allegations to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The action was dismissed.
60. In re Sloan, 5 N.M. 590, 25 P. 930 (1891).
61. 60 N.M. 226, 290 P.2d 1067 (1955).
62. Id.
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Plaintiff appealed, and the supreme court resoundingly affirmed,
giving full life to the inchoate doctrine of Heron. The court began
with the principle that the nature of the action was to be determined
not by the style of the case or form of the pleading, but rather by an
ad hoc analysis of the relief requested and the parties involved. Point-
ing out that this was an action against a public officer to force
compliance with a legal duty, the court believed itself compelled to
follow the Heron rule that "any order commanding a public officer
to perform a ministerial duty is equivalent to a writ of mandamus
and shall be governed by the rules for issuing such writs."'6
In Laumbauch, unlike Heron, the rule was applied to the mere
technicalities of mandamus pleading.6 4 The court followed the
mandamus principle that the case must be tried solely on the writ
and the answer. Finding the order to show cause to be a wholly
insufficient alternative writ, the court affirmed the dismissal of the
lower court despite the presence of a complaint with all the neces-
sary allegations to warrant consideration on the merits.
Under a literal reading of Laumbauch, all actions seeking to
compel action by public officials must be brought in mandamus, and
the lack of the formal requirements of mandamus pleading will doom
the action to failure. This places the prospective litigant in a serious
dilemma. As will be discussed in more detail,6 s there must be no
adequate remedy at law or any official discretion involved if man-
damus is to succeed. Even where a case involves official discretion or
an available remedy at law exists, the strict application of Laum-
bauch would force a litigant to pursue mandamus as an exclusive
remedy, risking a ruling that mandamus will not lie. If, on the other
hand, the pleader ignores Laumbauch and files an action for declara-
tory or injunctive relief, he runs the risk of a Laumbauch dismissal
for failure to plead in mandamus. 6 6
One method of obviating the problem was brought to light in
Montoya v. Blackhurst.6 7 In Montoya the magistrate court had
issued an ex parte writ of replevin, pursuant to the New Mexico
63. 60 N.M. at 233, 290 P.2d at 1071, quoting Heron v. Garcia, 48 N.M. 507, 508, 153
P.2d 514, 515 (1944). The fact that the complaint asked for a negative injunction against
adjournment of the canvassors was of no moment to the court; this point was brushed aside
with the assertion that the injunctive relief requested in the complaint was merely sought to
aid the court's mandamus powers.
64. In Heron, the question was one of substance, ie., is the legal duty clear?
65. See When Mandamus Will Lie, infra. p. 169.
66. For a classic example of the consequences which can result from failing to heed
Laumbauch, see Alfred v. Anderson, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions 54
(1974).
67. 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
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replevin statute.6 8 Petitioner filed a mandamus action in the district
court seeking to invalidate the replevin statute on the grounds that
the magistrate court had a mandatory, non-discretionary duty under
the United States and New Mexico Constitutions to provide notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the issuance of writs of
replevin.
Laumbauch apparently dictated mandamus since the case sought
to compel public officers (the magistrate judges) to comply with
their obligation under the law. However, in anticipation of the possi-
bility that the district court would conclude mandamus was im-
proper because (1) there existed an adequate remedy at law by
appeal, or (2) the case involved a discretionary function of the
Judges, the petition was amended to a complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief or in the alternative, petition for alternative writ of
mandamus. The district court ordered Defendants to show cause why
a declaratory judgment should not be awarded and why an injunc-
tion should not issue. The court also issued an alternative writ of
mandamus, returnable on the same day as the order to show cause. If
mandamus was proper, the court could make the writ permanent,
and if it was improper but the case merited relief, the court could
grant the declaratory and injunctive relief. At the hearing on the
merits, the district court granted both forms of relief. It declared the
statute unconstitutional, enjoined its enforcement, and issued a per-
emptory writ of mandamus. On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme
Court affirmed the granting of the writ of mandamus.
The appellants-respondents contended on appeal that under Laum-
bauch, the only allowable pleadings in a mandamus action were the
Writ and the Answer, and therefore it was reversible error to join a
mandamus action with a complaint for declaratory and injunctive
relief. The court expressly stated that it did not decide whether
joinder of declaratory judgment with mandamus was proper, but in
ruling on the propriety of mandamus and affirming the lower court,
it did decide that issue, albiet sub silentio.6 9 Reading Montoya with
prior supreme court rulings that injunctive relief may be combined
with mandamus, 7 and that a declaratory judgment is also appropri-
ate where mandamus will lie, 1 leads to the firm conclusion that
alternative pleading is valid, and can obviate the Laumbauch prob-
68. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-13-6 (1953), et. seq.
69. Cf. Alfred v. Anderson, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions 54
(1974).
70. Laumbauch v. Board of County Comm'rs., 60 N.M. 226, 290 P.2d 1067 (1955). In re
Sloan, 5 N.M. 500, 25 P. 930 (1891).
71. Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958).
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lem. 7 2 If the court concludes the action is not ripe for mandamus,
declaratory and injunctive relief can be awarded. Alternatively, if the
court concludes it is ripe for mandamus, the declaratory and injunc-
tive relief can be denied at no loss to the petitioner.
Where Heron and Laumbauch lead us astray is in the negative
inference present in both cases that declaratory and injunctive relief
may not be sought against public officials to compel them to follow
the law. Declaratory and injunctive relief have been used to that
end,7 3 and pleading in that form against government officials need
not be abandoned, Laumbauch to the contrary notwithstanding.
7 4
WHEN MANDAMUS WILL LIE
There are three major areas of concern for the litigant seeking to
challenge official action or inaction by way of mandamus. First, in
order to have standing the petitioner must be a party "beneficially
interested" within the meaning of the mandamus statute.7 " Second,
it must be clear that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy
at law.7 6 And, finally, petitioner must not be seeking to control
official discretion. 7 1 If any of these three factors are wanting, man-
damus will not lie and the action will be subject to dismissal. Since
these three issues are critical to the decision to seek mandamus, each
shall be analyzed individually, in an effort to uncover the pitfalls
awaiting those who may resort to mandamus without adequately
assessing its propriety.
A. Standing-When is a Party "Beneficially Interested"?
Any consideration of standing in mandamus begins with the
72. Where alternative pleading is used, however, adherence to mandamus pleading re-
quirements cannot be avoided. Compare Blackhurst v. Montoya, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176
(1972), with Alfred v. Anderson, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions 54
(1974).
73. Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958); See Peoples Constitutional Party
v. Evans, 83 N.M. 303, 491 P.2d 520 (1971).
74. Welcome clarification in this area could come from express supreme court recogni-
tion of the fact that suits for declaratory and injunctive relief are equally appropriate. While
mandamus is generally more expeditious, since the court may set the answer date short of
the normal 30 days, this difference is diminished somewhat by Rule of Civil Procedure 65
which allows for consolidation of a hearing on the merits with a hearing on preliminary
injunction, if expedition in an injunctive action is necessary. Mandamus, of course, may be
sought originally in the supreme court, while an injunctive action must be brought in district
court. These and other distinctions must be weighed by the litigant in choosing the form of
action, but a well pleaded action in either form should pass muster with the modern court.
For a further discussion of this point see note 100, infra, and text accompanying notes
173-79, infra.
75. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-5 (1953).
76. Id.
77. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-4 (1953).
May 1974]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
seminal case of State ex. rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque. 8 In Burg,
the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus against the city and the
city commissioners to compel them to submit an ordinance granting
a utility franchise to the voters pursuant to a proper referendum
petition. The district court dismissed the writ for failure to state a
cause of action, and the supreme court reversed and remanded.
Addressing the contention that petitioner did not have standing,
the court stated as the general rule:
... that mandamus may be issued to enforce the performance of a
public duty by public officers, upon application of any citizen
whose rights are affected in common with those of the public.
Such person is "beneficially interested" in the enforcement of
the laws. 7
9
After reviewing the status of the law relative to whether mandamus
can be brought only by the Attorney General, the court opted for
the prevailing view that private persons may move for mandamus to
enforce a public duty. Following its stated rule, the court held that
petitioner's status as a resident and qualified elector of the City of
Albuquerque was sufficient to "imply that degree of identification
with the citizenship of the community" 8 that would entitle him to
bring the action.
The broad standing definition enunciated in Burg-"any citizen
whose rights are affected in common with those of the public"-was
further developed in Hutcheson v. Gonzales.8 1 Hutcheson involved
an original petition filed in the supreme court by a qualified elector
against the Secretary of State to compel her to comply with Article
XIX, Section 1 of the Constitution which seemingly obligated her to
place certain proposed Constitutional Amendments on the general
election ballot.
The court considered together respondent's contentions that the
original writ was improvidently issued and that petitioner lacked
standing "because the same principles touch each contention." 8 2
Relying on an early original jurisdiction case, the court expanded the
Burg doctrine to allow standing in mandamus "where the case 'is
publici juris; that is, a case which affects the sovereignty of the state,
78. 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926).
79. 31 N.M. at 584, 249 P. at 246.
80. 31 N.M. at 586, 249 P. at 247.
81. 41 N.M. 474, 71 P.2d 140 (1937).
82. 41 N.M. at 491, 71 P.2d at 151. See notes 2-5 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of original mandamus jurisdiction.
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its franchises or prerogatives or the liberties of its people.' "I I
(Emphasis by the court.) Finding that this case involved the right to
vote, which the court characterized as "one of the 'blessings of lib-
erty,' "84 the court ruled that petitioner was "beneficially inter-
ested" within the meaning of the mandamus statute.8 ' Burg and
Hutcheson clearly established that standing in mandamus is broadly
conferred upon those seeking to enforce public rights. In essence,
then, a petitioner in mandamus is in the nature of a private attorney
general, seeking to protect rights which are of a public nature.
Unfortunately, in State ex rel. Gomez v. Campbell8 6 the waters of
mandamus standing were muddied. Gomez was brought by "res-
idents, citizens, qualified electors and taxpayers of the City and
County of Santa Fe" 8"7 who sought by way of mandamus to compel
the transfer to Santa Fe of all offices of the executive branch of
government. The action was based upon certain constitutional re-
quirements for the Executive Branch.8"
The Gomez court sidestepped both Hutcheson and Burg by find-
ing that "[ti here is no question in this case relating to the elective
franchise or the right to vote ... ,8 9 Relying primarily upon
Asplund v. Hannett,9 ° the court concluded that petitioners were
without standing. Surprisingly, however, after denying standing and
warning against the dangers of rendering advisory opinions, the court
turned to consider the merits, stating:
However, upon rare occasions involving questions of great public
interest, the Court may, in its own absolute discretion, proceed to
determine the question. (citations omitted) Although not without
reluctance, in our judgment the instant case is a proper one for such
a determination. 9 (emphasis supplied)
83. Hutcheson v. Gonzales, 41 N.M. 474, 492, 71 P.2d 140, 151, citing State ex rel.
Owen v. Van Stone, 17 N.M. 41, 121 P. 611,613 (1912).
84. 41 N.M. at 492, 71 P.2d at 151.
85. 41 N.M. at 494, 71 P.2d at 152. The court distinguished the narrow non-mandamus
standing case, Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926), on grounds that
plaintiff in that case brought the action as a taxpayer seeking to vindicate merely a private
right.
86. 75 N.M. 86, 400 P.2d 956 (1965).
87. Id. at 88, 400 P.2d at 958.
88. Article V, Sec. 1 of the New Mexico Constitution reads in pertinent part as follows:
The officers of the executive department except the lieutenant-governor, shall
during their terms of office, reside and keep the public records, books, papers
and seals of office at the seat of government.
89. 75 N.M. at 91, 400 P.2d at 959.
90. 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074 (1926).
91. 75 N.M. at 92, 400 P.2d at 960 (emphasis added).
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The action of the court in Gomez belied its words. While stating that
the petitioners lacked standing, the court applied a variation of the
Burg-Hutcheson rule and allowed the case to proceed because of its
public import. 92
The court moved back to its pre-Gomez view of mandamus stand-
ing in word as well as deed in State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New
Mexico State Tax Commission.9 3 In Castillo, the court held that
petitioner had standing even though the right sought to be enforced
was a private right (the right of a taxpayer) because the "case in-
volves a question of such unusually great public interest that we feel
called upon to exercise the discretion vested in us and to determine
the issue." 9 4
The court, in 1971, gave renewed emphasis to the Burg-Hutcheson
public interest concept of standing in mandamus actions in Womack
v. Regents of the University of New Mexico.9  While holding that
Petitioner did not have standing as a mere taxpayer, the court, citing
Burg, went out of its way to declare in dictum that: "This is not to
say that a private person may not sue for mandamus to enforce a
public duty not due to the state."'9 6
Most recently the court reemphasized that standing in mandamus
is dependent upon the public nature of the right sought to be en-
forced. In City of Santa Rosa v. Jaramillo9" the court found that a
city had standing to challenge by way of mandamus the failure of the
Alcoholic Beverage Control Department to revoke a license as re-
quired by law. The court relied on the fact that "the object is the
enforcement of a public right," 9 I and then took the public interest
notion to an extreme, noting that in this case (where the petitioner
was a municipality) it was not even necessary for the petitioner "to
show that it had any legal interest in the result."' 9 9
In essence then, standing in mandamus is based upon the public
nature of the issue sought to be resolved. If the right sought to be
enforced is public in nature, then petitioner has standing to bring the
92. For a somewhat different view of Gomez see Utton, Law of Standing in New Mexico,
2 N.M. L. Rev. 171, 182-85 (1972).
93. 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1969).
94. Id. at 359, 443 P.2d at 852. In State, ex rel. Barela v. New Mexico State Board of
Education, 80 N.M. 220, 453 P.2d 583 (1969), the court, without extended discussion,
waived aside lack of standing arguments in a case in which petitioners brought an action as
mere property owners within a school district seeking to void a consolidation by way of
mandamus. This case can be rationalized only on the private-right-brigaded-with-
public-interest doctrine of Castillo.
95. 82 N.M. 460, 483 P.2d 934 (1971).
96. 82 N.M. at 461, 483 P.2d at 934.
97. 12 N.M. State Bar Bull. 624 (1973).
98. 12 N.M. State Bar. Bull. at 625.
99. Id.
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case. If the right is private in nature, standing will be found if the
private right is infused with sufficient public importance. The court
has, thus, given sufficiently broad definition to "a person beneficially
interested" within the meaning of the mandamus statute to allow
private suitors to vindicate public rights or private rights clothed with
public interest. As a result, where clear official wrongs are perpe-
trated against the public at large, the remedy is at least theoretically
available through any person.1 00
B. Is There a Plain, Speedy and Adequate Remedy at Law?
The, second prerequisite for mandamus is the absence of any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.' If
there is an alternative remedy, the writ ordinarily will not issue.' 0 2
The words "remedy in the ordinary course of law" have been defined
as: (a) a remedy in damages; (b) a remedy by appeal to a higher
court; and (c) an administrative remedy.
Mandamus is not a proper remedy to enforce contract rights since
there exists an adequate remedy at law for damages.' 03 Also, if
there exists a remedy by way of quo warranto, mandamus will not
lie.' 4 Where the alternative remedy for damages is not adequate, as
in the case of an action to compel the state to comply with its
obligations under a contract involving real property, mandamus will
lie. 105
Initially, the New Mexico Supreme Court took a restrictive view of
mandamus where an appeal might lie. Following the narrow view of
mandamus expressed in Conklin v. Cunningham,' 06 the court in
State ex reL Sweeney v. Second Judicial District Court" 0 ' held that
100. The public nature of standing and the need to allege it in those terms in mandamus
is radically different from the standing considerations in the usual injunction case. The latter
situation usually calls for alleging standing in private and personal terms rather than in the
posture of vindication on behalf of the public. This conceptual difference should be kept in
mind and considered in deciding whether to bring an action in mandamus or injunction. For
a discussion of other differences between injunction and mandamus, see note 74, supra and
text accompanying notes 173-79, supra.
101. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-5 (1953).
102. State ex rel. Sweeny v. Second Judicial Dist., 17 N.M. 282 (1912). As pointed out
in note 18, supra, the supreme court may issue the writ under its superintendency power
irrespective of the adequacy of other remedies.
103. Shepard v. Board of Education of Jemez Springs Mu. School Dist., 81 N.M. 585,
470 P.2d 306 (1970), Sanchez v. Board of Education of Town of Belen, 80 N.M. 286, 454
P.2d 768 (1969), State ex rel. Evans v. Field 27 N.M. 384, 201 P. 1059 (1921), State v.
Board of Education, 18 N.M. 183 (1913).
104. Jaramillo County Clerk v. State ex rel. Board of County Comm'nrs., 32 N.M. 20,
250 P. 729 (1926).
105. State Highway Commission v. Clark, 79 N.M. 29, 439 P.2d 547 (1968).
106. 7 N.M. 445, 455, 38 P. 170 (1894).
107. 17 N.M. 282, 127 P. 23 (1912).
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mandamus would not lie to compel a district court to reinstate an
appeal from probate court which it had dismissed for want of juris-
diction, as there existed an adequate remedy by appeal.' 0 8
Since Sweeney, the court has carved out numerous exceptions to
this rule and held that the writ will issue, notwithstanding the exis-
tence of a right of appeal: (1) where the process of appeal will result
in unnecessary delay and expense;1 9 (2) where it will result in the
denial of fundamental constitutional rights;' ' 0 (3) where the peti-
tioner is clearly and unquestionably entitled to relief on the
merits; 1 1 and (4) where the issue would be moot on appeal.1 1 2
In State ex rel. Cardenas v. Swope,' ' 3 the court issued a writ to a
district judge directing him to set a case for trial in Valencia County,
after he had granted a motion for a change of venue to Bernalillo
County. The court held that the remedy by appeal was inadequate
because of the great delay and expense involved if the petitioner had
to defend and appeal the decision to the supreme court for reversal
on the technical ground of improper venue.
In Flores v. Federici,' 1 1 the defendant in a criminal case was
denied the right to trial by jury under Article II, Section 12 of the
New Mexico Constitution. The court concluded the writ should be
granted notwithstanding the right of appeal, because of the "funda-
mental right" involved:
The respondent strongly asserts that mandamus is not proper since
petitioner has an adequate remedy at law. Frankly, we do not agree.
The petitioner has been denied a fundamental right which should
not be left to any contingency. We think mandamus is the proper
remedy. To hold otherwise could lead to palpable absurdity.' '
(emphasis supplied)
108. 17 N.M. at 285, 127 P. at 25. Finding the remedy by appeal to be adequate in
workmen's compensation cases, the court has declined to consider such a case by way of
mandamus. State ex rel. Gallegos v. McPherson, 63 N.M. 133, 314 P.2d 891 (1957). The
Court also has found appeal to be adequate to challenge an adverse decision of the Com-
mission of Public Lands, absent the existence of exigent circumstances. Andrews v. Walker,
60 N.M. 69, 287 P.2d 423 (1955).
Most recently the court found an adequate remedy by way of appeal from an
order refusing to quash a writ of garnishment where the question is the juris-
diction of the issuing court. Alfred v. Anderson, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin
and Advance Opinions 54 (1974).
109. State ex rel. Cardenas v. Swope, 58 N.M. 296, 270 P.2d 708 (1954).
110. Flores v. Federici, 70 N.M. 358, 374 P.2d 119 (1962).
111. Sender v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860 (1963).
112. Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
113. 58 N.M. 296, 270 P.2d 708 (1954).
114. 70 N.M. 358, 374 P.2d 119 (1962).
115. Id. at 361, 374 P.2d at 121 (Emphasis added).
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In Sender v. Montoya,' 1 6 the court added another consideration
to be weighed in determining whether the remedy by appeal is
adequate. The supreme court in Sender granted a writ of mandamus
against a district judge ordering him to dismiss a complaint for failure
of prosecution. Relying on Swope and Flores, the court listed as one
of its reasons for granting the writ, that "the final result cannot be
otherwise than favorable to Petitioner."' ' The court concluded
that mandamus is proper whenever "a refusal to do so would have
required a reversal on appeal after trial."' 18
If Sender were read to allow mandamus whenever a petitioner is
able to establish that he will succeed on appeal, it would negate theinadequate remedy of law doctrine and render every clear error by adistrict court subject to review by way of mandamus. The Senderfact situation involved sufficient burden, expense, delay and hard-
ship, however, to render remedy by appeal inadequate.1 '9 When
such circumstances exist, the certainty of success on appeal becomes,
as it did in Sender, an important consideration in favor of allowing
mandamus.
Most recently in Montoya v. Blackhurst,' 20 the court added
another consideration in determining whether the remedy by appeal
would be adequate-whether the issue on appeal would be mootbecause the damage sought to be prevented would already beendone. Montoya was an attack on the constitutionality of the magis-
trate court replevin statutes. The supreme court concluded man-
116. 73 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860 (1963).
117. Id. at 291, 387 P.2d at 863.
118. Id.
119.
The issue in the trial court involves the ownership and right to possession of
over three hundred separate documents, many of which are several pages inlength and practically all of which are in longhand in the Spanish language.For these documents to be transcribed, and perhaps translated, would of itself
involve great cost and considerable delay in the preparation of a transcript,
even if the ordinary delays attendant to a somewhat involved trial could be
minimized. It would be many months, if not years, before the case could bedecided by us. However, this of itself would not justify the extraordinary
relief sought.... It is more the combination of all the various facets of thelitigation which makes it apparent that to refuse the writ "would result in
needless expense and delay.
Id. at 291, 387 P.2d at 863.
120. 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972). See also, State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. NewMexico State Tax Comm'n., 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850; State ex rel. State HighwayComm'n v. Clark, 79 N.M. 29, 439 P.2d 547 (1968). It is important to note that the courthas held that where a petitioner fails to exhaust an available remedy by appeal, he totallyforecloses his right to mandamus, even though the right of appeal no longer exists. StateBoard of Parole v. Lane, 63 N.M. 105, 314 P.2d 602 (1957).
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damus was proper because the constitutional issue would have been
moot on appeal:
In order to test the constitutionality of the procedures of the re-
plevin sfatute, a defendant must appear at the hearing and assert as a
defense the unconstitutionality of the replevin statutue. If he should
lose, on appeal to the district court, the issue of a taking without a
prior hearing would clearly be moot because he had his day in court
at the magistrate level. If he should win on the merits at the magis-
trate level there would be no appeal to test the taking of his prop-
erty without notice and an opportunity to be heard.' 2 '
The keys, then, to the allowance of mandamus as a remedy when
the right of appeal exists, are the presence of irreparable injury, the
deprivation of a fundamental right, great hardship, costly delays and
unusual expense, which, when taken together, render the remedy by
appeal inadequate. Where the harm to petitioner is sufficiently grave
the court has not been timid about deeming the remedy by appeal
inadequate.
An adequate remedy by appeal to an administrative body will bar
mandamus 1 2 2 as certainly as an adequate remedy by appeal to a
court, and similar rules apply to the determination of whether the
administrative appeal is adequate.' 2 ' Although mandamus will not
lie before administrative remedies have been exhausted, it is the
appropriate remedy to compel a state agency to provide adminis-
trative remedies it has failed to make available. 24
A dilemma is created by two somewhat contradictory New Mexico
decisions relating to exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to
application for mandamus. In Brown v. Romero, 12 1 the plaintiff, a
school teacher, was terminated without written notice or opportu-
nity to be heard. The terms of her teaching contract provided that
unless she received written notice to the contrary, her contract was
automatically renewed each year. Pursuant to statute, she sought a
hearing before the local school board. The board denied her a hearing
contending that she was not entitled to one because she did not have
tenure. From the denial of a hearing, Mrs. Brown appealed to the
state board which also refused her a hearing. From the state board
denial a statutory appeal was taken to district court. In district court,
121. 84 N.M. at 92, 500 P.2d at 177.
122. Tafoya v. New Mexico State Police Bd., 81 N.M. 710, 472 P.2d 973 (1970). Shep-
ard v. Board of Education of Jemez Springs, 81 N.M. 585, 470 P.2d 306 (1970).
123. See, e.g., Tafoya v. New Mexico State Police Bd., 81 N.M. 710, 472 P.2d 973
(1970).
124. Stapleton v. Huff, 50 N.M. 208, 173 P.2d 612 (1946).
125. 77 N.M. 547, 425 P.2d 310 (1967).
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the boards of education which had denied her a hearing, moved to
dismiss her appeal for her failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The district court agreed with the boards and dismissed the action.
The supreme court affirmed, holding that in this case exhaustion of
the remedy of mandamus was a prerequisite to statutory appeal to
district court:
The allegation that both the local board and the State Board refused
a hearing makes it plain that the teacher in this instance has failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies. Mandamus was available as a
remedy to test Mrs. Brown's right to a hearing before the governing
board.' 26
The Brown case clearly holds that before an appeal can be sought in
the courts from an inadequate administrative hearing or a failure to
grant a hearing, the plaintiff must first exhaust available extra-
ordinary remedies.
On the other hand, the court in State ex rel. Shepard v. Board of
Education of Jemez Springs, 12 ' held that a party must exhaust his
administrative and judicial remedies of appeal before mandamus is
proper.' 28 If these appellate routes are ignored, mandamus will not
lie. The teaching of the two cases taken together is that after an
adverse decision of a state agency, the petitioner must attempt to
invoke whatever administrative review is available. If no hearing is
granted, however, the only appropriate way to proceed is to seek a
writ of mandamus prior to appealing through the administrative
framework. If, on the other hand, an opportunity for a hearing is
provided by the agency, the petitioner is obligated to seek review by
way of available administrative and judicial appeals.' 2 9
C Does the Writ Seek to Control "Official Discretion"?
The third line of inquiry by a court in evaluating the propriety of
mandamus is whether the petitioner is attempting to control official
126. 77 N.M. at 549, 425 P.2d at 312.
127. 81 N.M. 585, 470 P.2d 306 (1970).
128. 81 N.M. at 586, 470 P.2d at 307. See, e.g., State Board of Parole v. Lane. 63 N.M.
105, 314 P.2d 602 (1957).
129. If, after a request for a hearing before the administrative agency a decision is
rendered denying relief to the petitioner which is based on factual determinations by the
agency, but the petitioner is unsure whether this would be construed by the court to
constitute a hearing, the safest route is to appeal from the decision and also seek the writ. In
the mandamus proceeding, the petitioner can take the view that the agency has failed toprovide him with an administrative hearing and therefore to protect his rights of appeal
under Brown he must seek the extraordinary writ. In the appellate case he should contend
that the decision was a final appealable administrative action. The cases should be consol-idated and the alternative theories explained as an attempt to avoid the Brown-Shepard
dilemma.
May 1974]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
discretion.1 3 0 The court speaks to the same issue by asking whether
the act sought to be compelled is a clear "ministerial duty," but the
inquiry under either label is the same. 
13 1
In outlining the contours of official discretion the court has
developed three lines of authority. One deals with the discretion of
judges, another with the discretion of public officers and a third with
judicial review of the fact-finding decisions of administrative bodies
where no right of appeal exists.
1. The Discretion of Judicial Officers.
The court in State ex rel. Sweeney v. Second Judicial 
District1 3 2
articulated its first general definition of judicial discretion:
In every court of general jurisdiction there resides authority which is
not strictly defined or limited by fixed rules of law, but which must
be exercised in order to justly vindicate substantive rights, properly
framed [sic.! issues, and duly conduct trial This authority may be
said in a general way to be the power of the judge to rule and decide
as his best judgment and sound discretion dictate.1 3  (emphasis
supplied)
Under this broad definition, the court held that the question of
jurisdiction over an appeal from probate court was within the discre-
tion of the district judge and not subject to control by man-
damus.1 34
The court has retreated dramatically from the absolute prohibition
laid down in Sweeney. In State ex rel. Heron v. Kool, 1 3 the court
held that even if the issue involves discretion, the writ is proper if
there has been an "abuse of discretion." ' 3 6 In Sender v. Mon-
toya, 1 17 the court, over the vigorous dissent of Justice Noble, nar-
rowed the scope of judicial discretion further. The petitioner brought
130. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-12-4 (1953). Although the statute refers to judicial discretion,
the term has been applied to all official discretion exercised by governmental agencies.
131. See, e.g., Witt v. Hartman, 82 N.M. 170, 477 P.2d 608 (1970).
132. 17 N.M. 282, 127 P. 23 (1912).
133. 17 N.M. at 283, 127 P. at 24, quoting Alexander v. Smith, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 304,
49 S.W. 916 (1899).
134. Id.
135. 47 N.M. 218, 140 P.2d 737 (1943).
136. 47 N.M. at 220, 140 P.2d at . In State ex rel. Cardenas v. Swope, 58 N.M. 296,
270 P.2d 708 (1954), the court found an abuse of discretion in a decision concerning proper
venue. One of the factors justifying the application of the abuse of discretion doctrine was
the tremendous waste of judicial time and resources if the matter proceeded to trial in the
wrong venue. Yet, in State ex rel. Gallegos v. MacPherson, 63 N.M. 133, 314 P.2d 891
(1957), the court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court in granting a new trial.
137. 73 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860 (1963).
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an original mandamus proceeding in the supreme court seeking to
compel a district judge to dismiss a replevin action brought against
him by the state records administrator. The basis of the petition was
the failure of plaintiff in the replevin action to take any action to
bring the case to trial for more than two years. The petitioner con-
tended that under Rule 41(e) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil
Procedure, the court had a non-discretionary duty to dismiss the
action. The trial court disagreed and refused to dismiss because the
plaintiff had filed requests for admissions within the two year period.
The supreme court granted the writ, concluding that the dismissal
under Rule 41(e) was mandatory notwithstanding the filing of the
requests for admissions. Justice Compton, writing for the court,
addressed the question whether an act by a judicial officer involves
judicial discretion if the judge must exercise legal or factual judg-
ment before acting. He concluded that even though a judicial act (in
this case whether to grant a Rule 41 motion) may require an exercise
of judgment, this does not mean it necessarily involves judicial discre-
tion. 1 3 8 He concluded further that there is no clear and distinct line
dividing acts which involve judicial discretion and those that do not.
Rather, each case must be examined on its own facts.' 39
Justice Noble, in dissent, attempted to define judicial discretion in
terms of whether the legal issue before the lower court had pre-
viously been ruled upon by the supreme court and hence was clear.
After pointing out that the court below had exercised judicial judg-
ment he stated:
The motion in this case sought dismissal for failure to prosecute
the action within two years after its filing. Response to the motion
recited the actions reflected by the files and called for the exercise
of judicial judgment as to whether any of those actions, including
plaintiffs request for admissions, constituted such action by plain-
tiff to bring the cause to its final determination as to satisfy the
138. 73 N.M. at 292, 387 P.2d at 862.
139.
Thus, Kiddy implies that mandamus will issue to control the actions of an
officer if he acts contrary to law, but the writ will be denied when the officer
decides in accord therewith. Other language in the opinion, to the effect that
mandamus is inappropriate where interpretation and judgment are necessary,
must be considered in context, not as an inflexible rule. Were it otherwise,
mandamus would practically never issue, because it can almost always be
shown that some form of judicial determination must be exercised upon which
the refusal to act is based. The border line between judicial discretion and
ministerial duty is not clearcut. It is frequently a matter of degree-a shading
from black to white or a grey area which can only be determined in each
particular case.
73 N.M. at 292, 387 P.2d at 863. (Emphasis added.)
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requirements of and prevent mandatory dismissal under Rule
41(e). 140
He concluded the writ should not have issued in this case and force-
fully argued it should not issue in any case where the exercise of
judgments of fact or law are involved.' 4 1 The court in Sender, by
rejecting the dissent of Justice Noble, highlighted its willingness in a
proper case to overturn a lower decision by mandamus, even though
the lower court exercised legal and factual judgment before acting.
In State ex reL Peters v. McIntosh, 142 the court without explana-
tion went further and stated that mandamus will control judicial
discretion if it will prevent the doing of useless things. In Montoya v.
Blackhurst, 143 the writ of mandamus issued to a magistrate judge
directing him to dismiss a writ of replevin previously issued because
the issuance of the writ violated due process. Issuance of the writ was
upheld even though the replevin statutes provided that the court
shall issue the writ of replevin upon posting of the appropriate bond.
The magistrate court had breached its mandatory duty to not follow
the statute in view of its higher duty to follow the United States
Constitution.' 
44
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the court's movement away
from the broad definition of "judicial discretion" articulated in
Sweeney, is found by a comparison of that case with the more recent
decision in Frock v. Fowlie. 1 4 - In Sweeney, the petitioner sought an
original writ in the supreme court to compel a district court to
assume jurisdiction of an appeal from probate court. The lower court
had previously dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The
supreme court denied the writ because there existed a plain speedy
and adequate remedy by appeal, and because the action of the lower
court involved judicial discretion.
Fifty-seven years later, an original writ was again sought from the
140. 73 N.M. at 293, 387 P.2d at 864.
141.
[B] ut this court has no original jurisdiction to direct the respondent court to
decide an issue, not theretofore specifically decided by this court, in a par-
ticular manner. (Citations omitted.) Mandamus was said in People v. Dusher,
411 IlL. 535, 104 N.E.2d 775, 779, not to lie to direct or modify the exercise
of judicial discretion where the Judge must answer the inquiry: " 'What is the
law and has it been violated or obeyed?'"
73 N.M. at 293, 387 P.2d at 864.
142. 80 N.M. 496, 458 P.2d 222 (1969).
143. 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972).
144. Even more recently, the court held that mandamus was the appropriate remedy for
compelling the District Attorney to comply with his mandatory duty under the due process
clause to not bring murder indictments against criminal defendants in breach of "plea
bargained" agreements. State ex rel Plant v. Scerese, 84 N.M. 312, 502 P. 1002 (1972).
145. 80 N.M. 506, 458 P.2d 581 (1969).
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supreme court again seeking to compel a district judge to assume
jurisdiction of an appeal from probate court. The district judge had
concluded he did not have jurisdiction of the appeal based upon his
interpretation of the complicated statutes relating to probate court
appeals. The supreme court in Frock analyzed the statutes, dis-
agreed with the interpretation of the lower court, and issued a per-
emptory writ directing him to reinstate the appeal without mention
of judicial discretion, Sweeney, or its progeny.
It is now beyond question that in cases involving questions of law,
such as the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute, the rubric
of judicial discretion is no longer a bar to mandamus.
2. Discretion of Public Officers
The decisions limiting the power of the court to review admin-
istrative discretion by mandamus did not have so humble or conserv-
ative a beginning as did the decisions dealing with the discretion of
judges. The supreme court has always been unwilling to restrict its
power to review administrative agencies by way of mandamus.
As early as 1913, in the case of Lorenzio v. James,' 14 6 the court
was called upon to answer the question whether certain county com-
missioners could be compelled to revoke a liquor license pursuant to
a statute which provided: "Any retail liquor license granted as pro-
vided for by law may be revoked by the Board of County Commis-
sioners of the county wherein the same was issued. . . ."' '
Although the statute on its face granted discretion to the com-
mission, by use of the word may, the court found that mandamus
was appropriate and no discretion was involved." 48 Nor did the fact
that the public officer made factual determinations in deciding
whether or not to revoke the license mean the duty was discre-
tionary:
A duty to be performed is nonetheless ministerial because the person
who is required to perform it may have to satisfy himself of the
existence of the state of facts under which he is given his right or
warrant to perform the required duty. 14 9
In State ex rel. Perea v. County Commissioners,' 50 the court
temporarily retreated from its position in Lorenzio. While agreeing
146. 18 N.M. 240, 135 P. 1172 (1913).
147. Laws 1905, ch. 115, § 4.
148. See State ex reL Robinson v. King, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance
Opinions 22 (1974), where any language in the election code was construed as being manda-
tory, thereby supporting a writ of mandamus.
149. 18 N.M. at 244-45, 135 P. at 1173.
150. 25 N.M. 338, 182 P. 865 (1919).
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that an act was not discretionary merely because it involved factual
determinations, the court suggested that if an exercise of judgment
was involved, the act was discretionary and mandamus would not lie:
A ministerial act is an act which an officer performs under a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of
legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety of the act being done. 1
The court, in Kiddy v. Board of County Commissioners of Eddy
County, 152 continued to backslide and articulated this very narrow
definition of acts subject to mandamus:
As brought out by the court in Wailes v. Smith, a nondiscretionary
or ministerial duty exists when the officer is entrusted with the
performance of an absolute and imperative duty, the discharge of
which requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judg-
ment. 1 s ' (emphasis supplied)
The retreat from Lorenzio, however, was shortlived. Just four
years after Kiddy, the court, in State ex rel. Four Corners Explora-
tion Co. v. Walker,1 I abandoned the position taken in Kiddy and
Perea. The court broadened its mandamus power by limiting the
inquiry into administrative discretion to an examination of whether
the law directs the public officer to act in a certain way. Whether or
not the administrator has made factual determinations or whether he
has exercised judgment before acting are not relevant under the Four
Corners test.
... it is nevertheless well established that mandamus will lie to com-
pel the performance of mere ministerial acts or duties imposed by
law upon a public officer to do a particular act or thing upon the
existence of certain facts or conditions being shown, even though
the officer be required to exercise judgment before acting.'
(emphasis supplied)
Under Four Corners, the defense of discretion by a public officer
151. 25 N.M. at 340, 182 P. at 866.
152. 57 N.M. 145, 255 P.2d 678 (1953).
153. 57 N.M. at 149, 255 P.2d at 681 (Emphasis added).
154. 60 N.M. 459, 292 P.2d 329 (1957). Since Walker, the court has upheld a mandamus
action against the state parole board. The court recognized that the parole board has dis-
cretion to determine whom it will parole, and whose parole it may choose to revoke. How-
ever, the court held that where statutes proscribed procedures for parole revocation and the
degree to which time previously served should be credited to his sentence, mandamus would
lie to compel compliance with the statutes. Conston v. New Mexico State Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 79 N.M. 385, 444 P.2d 296 (1968).
155. 60 N.M. at 463, 292 P.2d at 331.
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appears to be limited to those situations where the official is not
obligated as a matter of law to do the act.
In summary, the court has taken the position that it will examine
acts of public officers on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
discretion is involved and hence whether mandamus will lie. The
court will not be deterred from reviewing official actions by manda-
mus solely because the public official was making factual determin-
ations or exercising judgment before acting.
3. Review of Administrative Fact-Finding Bodies Where No Right
of Appeal Exists
In Swisher v. Darden,' 56 the court expanded the scope of man-
damus by holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy for re-
view, on the record, of final agency action where no right of appeal
exists. That decision placed administrative fact-finding boards in a
category separate and apart from traditional mandamus respondents.
Mary Alice Swisher, a black, tenured teacher at Booker T. Wash-
ington High School in Las Cruces was terminated by the local school
board when the black and white high schools in Las Cruces were
integrated. She appealed the decision to the state school board,
which found she had been terminated "without just cause." The
local board refused to follow the state board's decision. Mrs. Swisher
brought a mandamus action in the district court to enforce the state
board decision against the local board. In the district court the board
attempted to put on evidence and the testimony of witnesses. The
court denied the proffer of additional evidence, and adopted the
findings and decision of the state board, holding that they were not
"arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable or capricious."' s I
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court, holding
that a mandamus action based upon the decision of an administrative
board should be tried in the same manner as an administrative
appeal, namely, on the record. The court also limited its review to
"Whether its [the state board's] decision is based upon substantial
evidence or whether it is arbitrary, unlawful, unreasonable or capri-
cious." 5 8
The court in Ross v. State Racing Comm 'n 9 followed the
Swisher case in reviewing by mandamus a final decision of the State
Racing Commission denying the award of a license to engage in horse
racing near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The court conceded that the
156. 59 N.M. 511, 287 P.2d 73 (1955).
157. 59 N.M. at 516, 287 P.2d at 77.
158. 59 N.M. at 515, 287 P.2d at 76.
159. 64 N.M. 478, 330 P.2d 701 (1958).
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power vested in a board to grant a license on prescribed conditions is
generally a matter of discretion. However, the court held, it had
power by way of mandamus to "correct arbitrary or capricious
action which amounts to an abuse of discretion and is thus contrary
to law."' 6 0 The court then reversed the racing commission because
there was "no factual basis for the conclusion reached here."' 61
The supreme court has adhered to the principles of Swisher and
Ross, and most recently articulated the state of the law in Sanderson
v. State Racing Comm'n:j 62
Generally, mandamus will not lie to control the discretion of an
administrative board. [Citations omitted] But an exception to the
general rule is recognized where the administrative board has acted
unlawfully or wholly outside its jurisdiction or authority, or where it
has abused its discretion. 16 3 (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the court has seen fit, where no right of review exists, to create
a right of judicial review by way of mandamus.' 64 When mandamus
is used in this manner it is clear that the court should apply the
traditional standard of review of administrative decisions.
MANDAMUS AND THE DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Perhaps one of the most significant features of mandamus is that it
creates a vehicle for avoiding the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Since the early case of State ex rel. Evans v. Field, 16 5 the supreme
court has stated that actions in mandamus against public officers are
not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because the suit is
not one against the state, but rather is to enforce a duty owed by a
public officer to his principal-the State. The court was unequivocal
in this regard, despite the fact that the case involved a contract with
the state and could result in an award of a money judgment against
the state.' 66
160. 64 N.M. at 483, 330 P.2d at 704.
161. Id.
162. 80 N.M. 200, 453 P.2d 370 (1969).
163. 80 N.M. at 201,453 P.2d at 370.
164. Resort to mandamus was made necessary by the failure of the New Mexico Admin-
istrative Procedures Act to provide for general applicability to all agencies. See N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 4-32-23 (1953), as amended.
165. 27 N.M. 384, 201 P. 1059 (1921).
166.
[W] here the law directs or commands a state officer to perform an act under
given circumstances, which performance is a mere ministerial act, not involving
discretion, mandamus will lie to compel the action, notwithstanding per-
formance of the state's contract may incidentally result. In such a case the
action is not really upon the contract, but is against the officer as a wrong-
doer. He is, under such circumstances, not only violating the rights of the
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The principle was reasserted in Gamble v. Velarde, an action
against the state auditor, and in Harriet v. Lusk,1 6 8 an action to
enjoin the consolidation of public schools. Although Harriet was an
action for declaratory and injunctive relief, the holding relating to
sovereign immunity was dictated by its similarity to mandamus. The
court concluded that had the action been in mandamus, sovereign
immunity would not have been a bar:
Before considering the merits of this case it is necessary to dispose of
appellee's contention that this is a suit against the state concerning
which the court is without jurisdiction. However, the defense of suit
against the state does not apply in this case ...
As we interpret Section 73-20-1 of 1953 Compilation, the duty of
the State Board of Education to determine the economic feasibility
of consolidation of schools not meeting minimum attendance re-
quirements was mandatory. There was no discretion to so determine
or not determine. If the board had refused to make the determin-
ation mandamus would certainly lie to enforce action on the part of
the board. 169
Most recently, in State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico State
Tax Comm'n, 1 70 the supreme court allowed a corporation to sue the
New Mexico Tax Commission' I71 in mandamus to compel it to
promulgate an order providing for a uniform assessment rate for ad
valorem taxes:
It is contended that the sovereign immunity doctrine is applicable
to this case. We find such an argument completely without merit,
having been answered in Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738(1958). This is not a suit against the State; it is a mandamus proceed-
ing to require the performance of a duty plainly required under the
constitution, i.e., to prescribe an assessment ratio so that property
shall be uniformly assessed in proportion to its value.1 72
The mandamus route around sovereign immunity has taken on
increased importance due to the confused state of New Mexico law
relator, but is disobeying the express command of his principal the state.
Injunction will likewise lie to restrain illegal action of a state officer, notwith-
standing a breach of the state's contract may thus incidentally be prevented.
Id. at 389, 201, P.2d at 1061.
167. 36 N.M. 262, 13 P.2d 559 (1939).
168. 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958).
169. 63 N.M. at 386, 320 P.2d at 740-41.
170. 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1969).
171. It is interesting to note that this was suit against the State Tax Commission as well
as the individual commissioners and the court apparently did not consider this to be a
problem.
172. 79 N.M. at 359, 443 P.2d at 852.
May 1974]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
in the area of injunctions against state officials caused by Sangre De
Cristo Development Corp., Inc. v. City of Santa Fe.1 73 The court in
Sangre De Cristo disregarded the substantial authority to the con-
trary1 7 and held that sovereign immunity is a bar to an action
seeking to enjoin a city and county from exercising planning and
platting authority over a subdivision on Indian land. The court cava-
lierly ignored the contrary authority stating:
A reference to the foregoing cited cases shows that in New Mexico
the doctrine of governmental immunity has not only been adhered
to in tort cases or in cases in which there is likely to be a direct and
adverse effect upon the public treasury, but in other types of cases
as well. 7
Although this sweeping assertion suggests that all of the previous
decisions of the court with respect to sovereign immunity have been
reversed, no such reading is compelled. At the outset, the court
pointed out that sovereign immunity became a problem because the
action was brought against the city and county and not the indivi-
dual city and county commissioners:
The issue of governmental immunity arises from the fact that the
Plaintiff sued defendants as governmental entities. The councilmen
and Commissioners of Defendants were not sued as individuals. '76
(emphasis supplied)
This language is an invitation to litigants to avoid the sovereign im-
munity doctrine in New Mexico by engaging in the Ex Parte
Young' 177 fiction of suing individuals-rather than the state-to en-
join them from acting illegally and unconstitutionally under color of
their office. This conclusion is bolstered by the recent decision of
Gomez v. Dulce Independent School District,' "' in which the court
held that the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 ' '9 states a cause of
action in state court and also creates an exception to the sovereign
immunity doctrine.
However, the confusion caused by Sangre De Cristo has hardly
173. 84 N.M. 343, 503 P.2d 323 (1972).
174. E.g., Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958); Board of Trustees of the
Town of Casa Colorado Land Grant v. Pooler, 32 N.M. 460, 259 P. 629 (1927); State ex rel.
Evans v. Field, 27 N.M. 384, 201 P. 1059 (1921).
175. 84 N.M. at 347, 503 P.2d at 327.
176. 84 N.M. at 346, 503 P.2d at 326.
177. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
178. 85 N.M. 708, 516 P.2d 679 (1974). Whether the Dulce Independent School Board
in addition to the individual members of that board is an appropriate defendant in a § 1983
action is now open to question in light of the Supreme Court's holding in City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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dissipated, and until further clarified by the supreme court, manda-
mus is the only sure way to avoid sovereign immunity problems
when seeking to compel action by governmental officials.
CONCLUSION
Early English antecedents of the modern writ of mandamus lead
us to expect a remedy extraordinary in nature and narrow in scope.
A reading of the New Mexico Mandamus Statute leads to the same
expectation, and the early New Mexico decisions reinforce that view
of the writ. Recent case law, however, has transformed the writ into
a thoroughly modern instrument.
The rigidity of form has survived the onslaught of time, but it is
not a stumbling block to the use of the writ. And, surely its historic
antecedants deserve at least that touch of recognition. Once past the
matter of form, however, mandamus becomes a versatile and useful
device.
The rules of standing in mandamus have been broadly defined to
allow individual vindication of public wrongs by way of the writ.
Furthermore, the availability of appeal is no longer an absolute road-
block to its issuance. In addition, the early definition of official
discretion has given way, allowing mandamus to be used to challenge
interpretations of law, even where those interpretations require fac-
tual judgments. Mandamus has also been used to impress a right tojudicial review where statutes expressly foreclose that right. Finally,
use of the writ is an express exception to and the surest way around
the defense of sovereign immunity.
The writ is now available against a plethora of officials,' 0 to
control such wide-ranging kinds of official action' 81 that in New
180. Writs of mandamus have issued to the Governor, State ex rel Shepard v. Mechem,
56 N.M. 762, 250 P.2d 897 (1952), the Attorney General, State ex rel. Maloney v. Neal, 80
N.M. 460, 457 P.2d 708 (1969), state boards and commissions, Sanderson v. State Racing
Commission, 80 N.M. 200, 453 P.2d 370 (1969), local boards and commissions, Mora
County Board of Education v. Valdez, 61 N.M. 361, 300 P.2d 943 (1956), municipalities,
State ex rel. Johnson v. Village of Carrizozo, 35 N.M. 597, 4 P.2d 922 (1931), and even
community ditch associations, State ex rel. Black v. Aztec Ditch Co., 25 N.M. 590, 185 P.
549 (1919).
181. Mandamus has been used: to compel the Governor to amend his proclamation of
election, State ex rel. Robinson P. King, 13 New Mexico Bar Bulletin and Advance Opinions
22 (1974), to require the Secretary of State to certify names for election, State ex rel
Chavez v. Evans, 79 N.M. 578, 446 P.2d 445 (1968), to challenge the constitutionality of a
statute, Montoya v. Blackhurst, 84 N.M. 91, 500 P.2d 176 (1972), to compel judges of
election to count certain ballots, Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157 (1944), to
compel the state to pay a judgment, State Highway Commission v. Quesenberry, 74 N.M.
30, 390 P.2d 273 (1964), to compel an ousted elected official to turn over his books and
papers to a newly elected successor, Conklin v. Cunningham, 7 N.M. 445, 38 P. 170 (1894),
to compel a county to assess utility taxes, State ex rel. Reynolds v. Board of Commissioners,
Guadalupe County, 71 N.M. 194, 376 P.2d 976 (1962), to compel a District Attorney to
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Mexico it has become the most common vehicle for challenging offi-
cial wrongs. In an era of expanding government size and concomitant
growth in governmental power, it is not surprising that the ancient
writ of mandamus should become a major device by which the indivi-
dual can control the abuse of governmental power.
live up to a plea bargain, State ex rel. Plant v. Scerese, 84 N.M. 312, 502 P.2d 1002 (1972),
to compel a District Judge to select jurors in a specific manner, State ex rel. Maloney v.
Neal, 80 N.M. 460, 457 P.2d 708 (1969), to compel a city to levy a tax to pay a judgment
obtained against it in tort, Barker v. State ex rel. Napoleon, 39 N.M. 434, 49 P.2d 246
(1935) as well as in contract, Territory ex rel. Pariear v. City of Socorro, 12 N.M. 177, 76 P.
283 (1904), to compel the State Tax Commission to recognize claims for per diem expenses,
State ex rel. Thompson v. Beall, 37 N.M. 72, 18 P.2d 249 (1932), to compel the State
Corporation Commission to pay salaries, State ex rel. Stephen v. State Corp. Commission,
25 N.M. 32, 176 P. 866 (1918), to compel a County Clerk to take down minutes of the
meetings, In re Delgado, 140 U.S. 586 (1891), to compel the Legislative Audit Commission
to recognize the constitutional position of State Auditor, Thompson v. Legislative Audit
Commission, 79 N.M. 693, 448 P.2d 799 (1969), to compel a city to hold a referendum
election, City Commission of Albuquerque v. State ex rel. Nichols, 75 N.M. 438, 405 P.2d
924 (1965), to compel the attorney general to certify a bond election, Board of Education
of Village of Cimarron v. Maloney, 82 N.M. 167, 477 P.2d 605 (1970), to compel the State
Police Board to provide an officer with a hearing, Tafoya v. New Mexico State Police Board,
82 N.M. 167, 472 P.2d 973 (1970), to compel the City to levy a tax to pay debts, McAtee v.
Gutierrez, 48 N.M. 100, 146 P.2d 315 (1944), and to compel the State Treasurer to invest
money from earnarked funds, State v. Marron, 18 N.M. 426, 137 P. 845 (1914).
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